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Victories of Political Liberalism 
As we have already suggested in the opening paragraphs of 
this chapter, the roots of political liberalism a n t ^ ^ t o H +ha . ^-TZ..'.-* 
nineteenth century. The philosophic principles of this creed ^yn^faif**^./ 
W e r e based on earlier ideas such as natural rights and u t i l i t a r ^ ^ ^ ^ r * * 
ianism. Political liberals held that human actions to be moral&*~**<6~&»* 
pirns t ne volmntary. and that a s o c i e t y seeking to follow the laws,^**^*-
of nature must cherish individual liberty. Since they b e l i e v e d ^ u ^ ^ ^ 
human reason, yas capahlp of d|scerning these JLaws., 44Jj6i__k& he-/lM&^~' 
lieved that enlightened self-interest was an accurate guide forx.>a«r/»yito 
political action. In the nexTTchapter w e Will fake note of they/^ < 2 /£^* 
kinsnTp which existed between political liberals and economic 
liberals. Here we need only to say that both envisaged the 
chief functions of the state as primarily protective of life, 
liberty, and property, and active mainly to check abuses and 
prevent license. 
To achieve a system which would incorporate these ideas, 
political liberals advocated limited, constitutional- and par-
liamejataxy~-finvernfflflnt it should be limited so that it could 
not infringe upon man's natural rights. It should be CXMC—UUL_~Ba 
Clonal (and uulBlUlJt ol Britain liberals insisted that it should 
be based on a written document) ijj^tfLdj&r-4haX.ii 
be sharply defined and circumscribed. It should be parliamentary, 
that is to say 
the organij 
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representative-,-*-since government should reflect 
tnd interje^i^--Qf--4he-^sommunity at large, 
Such a political system would provide the people with the 
forum necessary for translating natural law into legislation. 
It was therefore vitaX'That guarantees of freedom of speech, 
press, assembly, petition, and religion be established, Lih=. 
erals believed that..religion was a peculiarly personal affair 
so long as it did not interfere with the duties of citizenship, 
and that church and state should be separatet Human serfdom 
and slavery they regarded as indefensible anachronisms. Hugo 
Grotius had mapped out a program for international comity, and 
later Rousseau, Bentham, and Kant had advanced various "peace 
projects," From these men political liberals drew ideas of 
practical pacificism. Finally, where they were not already in 
practice, tney sought to establish legal principles of due 
process of law, equality before the law, privacy of the home, 
and a milder penal code, In many respects the program of the 
nineteenth century political liberal is neatly summarized in 
the American Bill of Rights, already cited in Chapter XI. 
It must be remembered that before 1848 political liberal-
ism was not generally synonymous with democracy," T*"nere~ the ""* 
former, favored the supremacy of parliaments, the latter pro-
claimed the supremacy of the people. The homrgeoisie provided 
the core,,of liberal strength (although in places the aristo-
crats contributed significantly to its support), and they were 
not eager to extend the franchise to. t n e masses. They stressed 
liberty more than they did equality. Property qualifications 
for voting still obtained and w e r e j u s t i f i e d on the grounds that 
freedom of economic opportunity (another liberal tenet) barred 
no sober and industrious man from the ranks of property holders. 
Many liberals, doubting that the masses were educationally 
qualified to participate in forming policy, supported free 
public education, despite their qualm? at the prospect of state 
control of the schools, 
this century was jaaAnlyone of degree, Whereas the former con-
c^ntrated"on checking arbTtrary "government, the latter sought to 
place the franchise on a broader basis with more equitable rep-
resentation in parliament. Democrats subsequently supported 
social-welfare legislation and after 1848, some professing demo-
crats flirted with Marxian socialism. In most instances, how-
ever, liberals and democrats had much in common and worked co-
operatively to achieve their respective ends. 
In England the constitutional settlement of 1689 had brought 
forth a system of government greatly admired by eighteenth cen-
tury critics like Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Rousseau, Yet, the 
ultraconservative Tory party in control prior to 1830 had fol-
lowed a semireactionary policy in domestic affairs while stoutly 
resisting demands for reform, Lib^rnl t h m r h t nt this tl*T*Q wag 
profoundly influenced by the iitilitarlan-do4*-tyines nf Jeremy 
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Bentham. One of the prominentwJBa_*thamj fes_ was the economist, 
James Jdili-, who with many other liberals believed that utili-
tarian aims would be most surely realizedythrough liberal and 
representative g o v e r n m e n t . / W ^ - ^ ^ ^ / ^ ' t / V * i ( ' * ! ^ ^ ' 
It was the special contribution of John Stuart 
i m t n r ° p * » o t a t j o n p f jg&XU S o SUC-clude a more social and hx 
cessiui was the younger Mill that through his efforts liberal-
Mill (1806-1873) , to .persuade his countrymen, (and the world at 
T~Tge) that Bentli^'s basic, principles .could he enlarged t,y yi-
" ~ " '
 J
" f m \ " " " " " " " ' " 
ism became "a representative manifestation of the national mind" 
and a tenet of all English political parties. A writer on eco-
nomic as well as political subjects, Mill did not conceive 
liberty... as.. gerelj^^hje„jah^^ and 
his distrust of "the tyranny of the majority" made him skeptical 
of some democratic dogmas^. His thought was to fight against 
all abuses of power and he occupied himself chiefly with a de-
fense of civil liberties as a means of bringing about the utili-
tarian standard of "the greatest good for the greatest number." 
To this end jUill published in $*85£phis justly celebrated 
essay, On Liberty. In the extract ^rhich follows the author 
suggested some practical rules for drawing the line between the 
llDerfy~ot t.he-'Wri,*.™*.riaini ^nd inirj al order
 f pointed put the dif-
ficulties inc'Ther-* 'n ""jptaining individual liberties, and 
oiiered some profound maxims on the theory of liberty. 
The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple 
principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings 
of society with the individual in the way of compulsion 
and control, whether the means used be physical force in 
the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of 
public opinion. That principle is, that the sole. enjd__fojr 
which man~fin'1 nrft warTMfeM^Ngt*, individually or collTclively^, 
in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
member, is sel f-pro t,e,ct- i or|. That the only purpose for 
which power ca n be rightfully ejeaaBs—aadUover any member 
of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent, 
ha,rm to others His own good, either physical or moral, 
is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully he 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for 
him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, 
in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or 
even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating 
with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or 
entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting 
him with any evil, in case he do otherwise. To justify 
that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him 
must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The 
only_j3arJL of the conducJL-Of._any-Xtne, for which he is amen-
able to society, is that which concerns, others^. In the 
part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, 
of right, absolute.^ Over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual T s sovereign. 
I t i s , perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this 
doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in th£ 
2 > - X I 1 1 p - 1 8 
maturity of their faculties, tte are not soeaking^of 
children^ or of young persons below the age which the 
law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood. .Those who 
are stj,ll in a state to require being taken car« QT n^it/*+**^' 
oJneESu must be. JPJCQtecteri agq^nst t ^ ^ W r ^ f i i i F ^ " ' 
wei] as aprainst external—in j w v i f r r—For the same reason, 
we may leave out of consideration those backward states 
of society in which the race itself may be considered as 
in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of 
spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom 
any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full 
of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of 
any expedients that will attain an end, perhaps other-
wise unattainable, pespotjsm is a legitimate mode of 
government in d e a l ^ n y w i t h hay]jj|jffi"-i*L**''** nrnvi flsrt'hia"end 
be their improvement, and the means justified by actu-
ally effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has 
no application to any state of things anterior to the 
time when mankind have become capable of being improved 
by free and equal discussion. Until then, there is 
nothing for them but implicit obedience to an Akbar or 
a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. 
But as soon as mankind hav^-a-ttainod the oapacity of 
beings guided to th^ -sir "**" improvement by conviction or 
persuasion (a period long since reached in a n nations 
with whom"we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, 
either in the direct form or in that of pains and penal-
ties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a 
means to their own good, ^ n d ^ j u s t i f i a b l e ^ o n l y f o r t h e 
security of others. 
It is proper to state that I forego any advantage 
which could be derived to my argument from the idea of 
abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. _I 
regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethic,al 
qaggyiona: but it must be ufu"TI>y m S B B x S S I « e n S A , 
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a pro-
gressive being. Those interests, I contend, authorize 
the subjection of individual spontaneity to external 
control, only in respect to those actions of each, 
which concern the interest of other people. If any one 
does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie 
case for punishing him, by law, or, where legal penal-
ties are not safely applicable, by general disapproba-
tion. There are also many positive acts for the benefit 
o^jojbhers~r wnichlie may. r^gT'tiTi^uTTy he., compellexi to per~~ 
foaaB^-such as, to give evidence in a court of justice; 
to bear his fair share of the common defence, or in any 
other joint work^necessary to the interest of the soci-
eiy_ of which he enjoys the protection; and to perform 
certain acts of individual beneficence, such as saving 
a fellow creature's life, or interposing to protect 
the defenceless against ill-usage, things which when-
ever it is obviously a man's duty to do, he may right-
fully be made responsible to society for not, doing. A / 
XIII p. 19 
person may cause evil to others not only by his actions 
B i t . h y ~ h i s i n a c t i o n ^ and i n ^ I t h A i * ffgfeA h e ~ T s j u S t l y — f t e -
countable to them for the injury. The latter case, it 
is true, requires a much more cautious exercise of com-
pulsion than the former. To make any one answerable for 
doing evil to others, is the rule; to make him answerable 
for not preventing evil is, comparatively speaking, the 
exception. Yet there are many cases clear enough and 
grave enough to justify that exception, fin all_jtbi"gs-
which regard the external relations of the individual, .Jig 
is de~~jure amenable to those wJiose interests are con-
cerned, and if need be, to society as their protector. 
There are often good reasons for not/ holding him to the 
responsibility; but these reasons must arise from the 
special e x p e d i e n c e s
 nf + h p caaa; either because it is s^™**,^/t/oti-
£3lZ*Hl ftf '"''g'3 in which he is on the whole likely to act r*JAi- a^u^^ 
beitej^vdieii_left to his own discretion, than when c o n - ^ r^s*J&/^tU4 
;rolled__in, g n y *a*ay 'iT" which society have it in their -—- ^ z ? 2 
jpower t o c o n t r o l him ~] or because, the attempt to exerciser******"?***? ' 
control would^produce other evils» greater than those 
which lit would prevent.) When such reasons as these pre-
clude the enforcement of responsibility, the conscience 
of the agent himself should step into the vacant judgment-
seat, and protect those interests of others which have no 
external protection; judging himself all the more rigidly, 
because the case does not admit of his being made account-
able to the judgment of his fellow-creatures. 
But there is a sphere of action in which society, as 
distinguished from the individual, has, if any, only gn 
indirect interest; comprehending alT""that portion of a 
person's life and conduct which affects only himself, or, 
if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary 
and undeceived consent and participation. When I say only 
himself, I mean directly, and in the first instances for 
whatever^afferts himself, may affect others through him^ 
seJLf.; and the objection which may be grounded on this con-
tingency, will receive consideration in the sequel. This, 
then, is the appropriate region of human liberty. It com-
prises, _first, the inward domain of r.onscioinsness_ demand-
ing liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; 
liberty of thought and feeling; absolute freedom o f opinion 
and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative, 
scientific, moral, or theological. The 1iherty of express-
ing—and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a dif-
ferent principle, since it belongs to that part of the con-
duct of an individual which concerns other people; but, 
being almost of as much importance as the liberty of 
^thought itself^ and resting in great part on the same 
reasons, is practically inseparable from-it. Secondly, 
the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits^ of 
framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of 
doing as we like, subject to such consequences as may 
follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so 
long as what we do does not harm them, even though they 
3 
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should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. 
Thirdly, from this liberty of each individual, follows 
of combination amo the liberty, within the same limits, 
individuals; freedom to unite, for a 
volving harm to others 
E* 
p o s e d T"o~~Be o f f u l l a g e 
the persons combining being sup-
and not forced or deceived. 
No society in which these liberties are not, on the 
whole, respected, is free, whatever may be its form of 
government; and none is completely free in whi^eh-ihey do 
not exist absolute and unqualified. The onjM 
which deserves the name, is that of__pjirsuing) our"o"w*n" good 
in our own way, so S G 5 L A a ^ 3 8 3 S ~ 5 ~ i ~ 5 ~ i S 3 *rn deprive 
otriers oi......M.e'xrs „ or impede their efforts^jto^oJlfai a- it 
Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether 
bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater 
gainers hy S_X£gjJjlg each other to live as, seems good _to 
t.fremsel ves^ than by compelling ea,ch to live as seems good. 
*ifewt*b* to the r e & W 
Though this doctrine is anything but new, and, to 
some persons, may have the air of a truism, there is no 
doctrine which stands more directly opposed to the general 
tendency of existing opinion and practice. Society has 
expended fully as much effort in the attempt (according 
to its lights) to compel people to conform to its notions 
of personal, as of social excellence. The ancient common-
wealths thought themselves entitled to practise - and the 
ancient philosophers countenanced, the regulation of every 'A ^ ^ t £ . 
part of private conduct by public authority, on the ground 
that the State had a deep interest in the whole bodily 
and mental discipline of every one of its citizens; a mode 
of thinking which may have been admissible in small repub-
lics surrounded by powerful enemies, in constant peril of 
being subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion, 
and to which even a short interval of relaxed energy and 
self-command might so easily be fatal, that they could 
not afford to wait for the salutary permanent effects of 
freedom. In the modern world, the greater size of polit-
ical communities, and above all, the separation between 
the spiritual and temporal authority (which placed the 
direction of men's consciences in other hands than those 
which controlled their worldly affairs), prevented so 
great an interference by law in the details of private 
life; but the engines of moral r e p ^ g g i " " haatfl heen
 7 ^ < ? ^ f «> ^ ^ ^ 
wjj>]ji&£\_ more strenuously against divergence from the ^JUMSUA. &&*- <f 
reigning opinion in self-regarding, than even in social
 c C ,.^^ ..//<//-
matters; religion, the most powerful of the elements ^^^^j^yUS 
which have entered into the formation of.moral feeling, ,-
having almost always been governed either by the ambition 
of a hierarchy, seeking control over every department of 
human conduct, or by the spirit of Puritanism, And some 
of those modern reformers who have placed themselves in 
strongest opposition to the religions of the past, have 
been noway behind either churches or sects in their asser-
tion of the right of spiritual domination-
 y M° C o m t e , i n /^ 
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particular, whose social system, as unfolded in his 
aims at establishing Traite" de Politique Positive, 
Tthough~~y moral more than by legal appliances) a 
despotism of society over the individual, surpassing any-
thing contemplated in the political ideal of the most 
rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers,... 
The t ime 
fencejwou Id.. he_ ne ce s s ar y o fL. the 
one of the secularities against 
it is to be hoped, is gone by, when any de-
" liberty of the press'' as 
corrupt or tyrranical 
government, No argument, we may suppose , can now be 
needed,-against permitting a legislature or an executive, 
not identified in interest with the people, to prescribe 
opinions to them, and determine what doctrines or what 
arguments they shall be allowed to hear. This aspect of 
the question, besides, has been so often and so trium-
phantly enforced by preceding writers, that it needs not 
be specially insisted on in this place. Though the law 
of England, on the subject of the press, is as servile to 
this day as it was in the time of the Tudors, there is 
little danger of its being actually put in force against 
political discussion, except during some temporary panic, 
when fear of insurrection drives ministers and judges from 
their propriety; and, speaking generally, it is not, in 
constitutional countries, to be apprehended, that the 
government, whether completely responsible to the people 
or not, will often attempt to control the expression of 
opinion, except when in doing so it makes itself the 
organ of the general intolerance of the public. Let us 
suppose, therefore, that the government is entirely at 
one with the people, and 
power of coercion unless. 
never thinks 
in agreement 
of exertii 
with what it 
iny 
con-
to be their voice 
sucK 
ceiyes 
people to"exercise 
by their governmen 
The ...besi.....goyej!;mttejit..J^ ^ 
worst. It is as noxious, or more noxious 
But I deny the right of the 
coercion, either by themselves or 
The power itself is illegitimate. 
in accordance with public opinion, 
to it. If all mankind minus one, were 
when exerted 
than when in opposition 
of one opinion, 
t h e contrary opinion, mankind 
silencing that one person, 
would be justified in silenc-
a personal possession of no 
to be obstructed in the en-
and only one person were of 
would be no more justified in 
than he, if he had the power, 
ing mankind. Were an opinion 
value except to the owner; if 
joyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make 
some difference whether the injury was inflicted only on 
a few persons or on many. But the peculiar_eyll of si-
lencing-JJut-eyprP^sjnn of 
bing the human _raoer°r posteri ty as well as the 
d^> 
generation; those who dissent 
more than those who hold it. 
they are deprived of the opportunity 
for truths'"Tf_wronp—.they- lose-»-jKha 
from the opinion, 
If the opinion is 
tanging 
~ ~ a l m o g j t _ a s - a LfcoUXr <J& 
b e n e f i t ^ t h e c l e a r e r p e r c e p t i o n a n d l i v e l i e r i m p r e s s i o n 
of"'*fl°?ath.-J p ^ p d i u c g d h y i t s c o l l l s i o x u i B i t h e r r o r " , 
ider separately these two y^c-
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hypotheses, each of which has a distinct branch of the 
argument corresponding to it. We can never be sure that 
the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opin-
ion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil 
still........ 
We have now recognized the necessity to the mental 
well-being of mankind (on which all their other well-
being depends) of freedom of opinion, and freedom of the 
expression of opinion, on four distinct grounds; which we 
will now briefly recapitulate. 
_JFirst_. if any opinion is compelled to silence, that 
opinion may, for aught we can certainly know, be true, To 
deny this is to assume our own infallibility. 
Sjscaaflly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it 
may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; 
and since the general or prevailing opinion on any subject 
is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the col-
lision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth 
has any chance of being supplied. 
Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, 
but the whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actu-
ally is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by 
most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a 
prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling of its 
rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the 
meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being 
lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on 
the character and conduct; the dogma becoming a mere 
formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering 
the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and 
heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience. 
Before quitting the subject of freedom of opinion, it 
is fit to take some notice of those who say, that the 
fypp, Avpypgsion of alj opinions should he pevmi tted , on 
condition that the manner be temperate, and do not pass 
the hounds of fair discussion. Much miffhj he said .on 
the ;i™rn-'*****~,-h11 ** +Y n f filing where these supposed bounds 
are to he placed; for if the test be offence to those 
whose opinion is attackejL I think exP<*'T'if'n<''c' testifies 
that this offence i s g i v e n whenever the attack is telling 
and powerful, and that"~every opponent who pushes them 
hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears 
to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, 
an intemperate opponent. But this, though an important 
consideration in a practical point of view, merges in a 
more fundamental objection. Undoubtedly the manner of 
asserting an opinion, even though it be a true one, may 
be very objectionable, and may justly incur severe censure. 
But the principal offences of the kind are such as it is 
mostly impossible, unless by accidental self-betrayal, to 
bring home to conviction. The gravest of them is, to 
argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to 
misstate the elements of the case, or misrepresent the 
opposite opinion. But all this, even to the most 
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aggravated degree, is so continually done in perfect good 
faith, by persons who are not considered, and in many 
other respects may not deserve to be considered, ignorant 
or incompetent, that it is rarely possible on adequate 
grounds conscientiously to stamp the misrepresentation as 
morally culpable; and still less could law presume to in-
terfere with this kind of controversial misconduct. With 
regard to what is commonly meant by intemperate discus-
sion, namely, invective, sarcasm, personality, and the 
like, the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more 
sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally 
to both sides; but it is only desired to restrain the em-
ployment of them against the prevailing opinion: against 
the unprevailing they may not only be used without general 
disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him who uses 
them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation. 
Yet whatever mischief arises from their use, is greatest 
when they are employed against the comparatively defence-
less; and whatever unfair advantage can be derived by any 
opinion from this mode of asserting it, accrues almost 
exclusively to received opinions. The worst offence of 
this kind which can be committed by a polemic, is to stig-
matize those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and 
immoral men. To calumny of this sort, those who hold any 
unpopular opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they 
are in general few and uninfluential, and nobody but 
themselves feels much interest in seeing justice done 
them; but this weapon is, from the nature of the case, 
denied to those who attack a prevailing opinion: they 
can neither use it with safety to themselves, nor, if 
they could, would it do anything but recoil on their own 
cause. In general, opinions contrary to those commonly 
received can only obtain a hearing by studied moderation 
of language, and the most cautious avoidance of unneces-
sary offence, from which they hardly ever deviate even in 
a slight degree without losing ground: while unmeasured 
vituperation employed on the side of the prevailing opin-
ion, really does deter people from professing contrary 
opinions, and from listening to those who profess them. 
For the interest. therefore, of truth and .justice^ it is 
far" more important to. res-train thlTS _finnrlovmentr**oi vituper-
ative language than the other; and, for example, if it 
were necessary to choose, there would be much more need 
to discourage offensive attacks on infidelity, than on 
religion. It is, however, obvious that law and authority 
have no business with restraining either, while opinion 
ought, in every instance, to determine its verdict by the 
circumstances of the individual case; condemning every one, 
on whichever side of the argument he places himself, in 
whose mode of advocacy either want of candor, or malignity, 
bigotry, or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves; 
but not inferring these vices from the side which a person 
takes, though it be the contrary side of the question to 
our own: and giving merited honor to every.one, whatever 
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opinion he may hold, who has calmness to see and honesty 
to state what his opponents and their opinions really 
are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit, keeping 
nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in 
their favor. This is the real morality of public discus-
sion; and if often violated, I am happy 
there are many controversialists who to 
to think that 
a great extent 
these pages must be more 
for discussion of details, 
of them to all the vari-
observe it, and a still greater number who conscientiously 
strive towards it........ 
The principles asserted in 
generally admitted as the basis 
before a consistent application 
ous departments of government and morals can be attempted 
with any prospect of advantage. The few observations I 
propose to make on questions of detail, are designed to 
illustrate the principles, rather than to follow them out 
to their consequences, I offer, not so much applications, 
as specimens of application; which may serve to bring into 
greater clearness the meaning and limits of the two maxims 
which together form the entire doctrine of this Essay, and 
to assist the judgment in holding the balance between them, 
in the cases where it appears doubtful which of them is 
applicable to the case. 
The maxims are, first, that the individual is not ac-
countable to society for his actions; in so far as these 
concern the interests of no person but himself. Advice. 
insJb2ucjjLoa,!, pexsuaslon, and avoidance by other people, if 
thought n e e e s s a r y B y them for their own g o o d , a r e tne only 
m e assures.., JaqtuJt*b&jab-aQaA*t^ 
T|^e-or-disap.probatiQn of his conduct.. Secondly, that for 
SUCh actions as _aXfi .prejudicial jo the., interests of others, 
the individual ..is accountable, and 
to s QciaJLjox^to 
ion that the one 
tion. 
legal punishments 
the other- 1 or 
the first place, it must 1 
damage, or probability of 
others, can alone justify 
that therefore it always 
many cases, an 
may ..be....subjected either 
if society Is ~of~"dpin-
requisite for its protec-
foy no means be supposed, 
damage, to the infer-
tile interference of 
does justify such in» 
indiyidMal^. in pnrs.ii j nft a 
and therefore 1 egi -Mma+oiy 
or intercepts a good which 
they had a reasonable hope of obtaining. Such oppositions 
_of .interest- between individuals ~of-ten ..arise ff onf ,b^2CStf-
ci_al^ _J.ns.ti.tll±l.Q.nss but are unavoidable while^-fcfeuSfe insti-
tutions ._!jkg_," and some would be unavoidable under any in-
stitutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profes-
sion, or in a competitive examination; whoever is pre-
ferred to another in any contest for an object 
desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, 
wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by 
common admission, better for the general interest of man-
kind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred 
by this sort of consequences. In other words, sjici^ty. 
admits—no rJghi, either legal or moral, in the disappointed 
In 
because 
ests of 
society 
terference 
legitimate -Object.
 1 necessarij Ty 
causes palp or ios.s..,.-tn nthftr"„ 
which both 
from their 
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competitors, to immunity from this kind of suffering: and 
feels called on to interfere».only when means of success 
have been employed which it is contrary to the general 
interest to permit — namely, fraud or treachery, and 
fJ>XO»-s— 
Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes 
to sell any description of goods to the public, does what 
affects the interest of other persons, and of society in 
general; and thus his conduct, in principle, comes within 
the jurisdiction of society: accordingly, it was once 
held to be the duty of governments, in all cases which 
were considered of importance, to fix prices, and regulate 
the processes of manufacture. But it is now recognized, 
though not till after a long struggle, that both the 
cjiejpjQe^s_and the good quality__of commodities are most 
effectually" provided lor by leaving the producers and 
sellers perfec'tTy free', under the ..sole check of equal 
freedom to the buyers for supplying themselves elsewhere. 
This is the so-called doctrine of gree. Trade, which rests 
on grounds different from, though equally solid with, the 
principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. 
Restrictions on trade, or on production for purposes of 
trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint., qua re-
straint, lis an evj*U but The restraints in question af-
fect only that part of conduct which society is compe-
tent to restrain, and are wrong solely because they do 
not really produce the results which it is desired to 
produce by them. As the principle of individual liberty 
is not involved in the doctrine of Free Trade, so neither 
is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the 
limits of that doctrine: as for example, what amount of 
public control is admissible for the prevention of fraud 
by adulteration; how far sanitary precautions, or arrange-
ments tr prfft^^t 'r^r^-p^opj g_Qn*p' T Q r t "w Sangerous occu-
pations, should be enforced on employers. Such questions 
involve considerations of liberty, only in so far as 
leaving people to themselves is always better, caeteris 
paribus, than controlling them: but that they may be 
legitimately controlled for these ends, is in principle 
undeniable. On the other hand, there are questions re-
lating to interference with trade, which are essentially 
questions of liberty; such as the Maine Law, already 
touched upon; the prohibition of the importation of opium 
into China; the restriction of the sale of poisons; all 
cases, in short, where the object of the interference is 
to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular 
commodity. These interferences are objectionable, not as 
infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, 
but on that of the buyer. 
One of these examples, that of the sale n f r n ' g " n g ) 
opens a new questlop; the proper limits of what may be 
called functions of police; how far liberty may legiti-
mately be invaded for the prevention of crime, or of 
accident. It is one of the undisputed functions of gov-
ernment to take precautions against crime before it has 
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been committed, as well as to detect and punish it after-
wards . Tjiejreyentive^function of government, however 
is f a r ^ E H I 5 S j i ^ ^ ~ ~ ~ 3 ~ " 
IiSerty" than" the punitory function; for there TsTiardly 
arHy" part of~tTie legitimate freedom of action of a human 
being which would not admit of being represented, and 
fairly too, as increasing the facilities for some form or 
other of delinquency. Nevertheless, if a public authority, 
or even a private person, sees any one evidently preparing 
to commit a crime, they are not bound to look on inactive 
until the crime is committed, but may interfere to prevent 
it. If poisons were never bought or used for any purpose 
except the commission of murder, it would be right 
to prohibit their manufacture and sale. They may, however, 
be wanted not only for innocent but for useful purposes, 
and restrictions cannot be imposed in the one case with-
out operating in the other. Again, it is a proper office 
of public authority to guard against accidents. If either 
a public officer or any one else saw a person attempting 
to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, 
and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they 
might seize him and turn him back, without any real in-
fringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing-
what one desirejs. and he does not desire to tall into the 
river. Nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but 
only a danger of mischief, no one but the person himself 
can judge of the sufficiency of the motive which may 
prompt him to incur the risk: in this case, therefore, 
(unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of 
excitement or absorption incompatible with the full use 
of the reflecting faculty), he ought, I conceive, to be 
only warned of the danger; not forcibly prevented from 
exposing himself to it. Similar considerations, applied 
to such a question as the sale of poisons, may enable us 
to decide which among the possible modes of regulation 
are or are not contrary to principle. Such a precaution, 
for example, as that of labelling the drug with some word 
expressive of its dangerous character, may be enforced 
without violation of liberty: the buyer cannot wish not 
to know that the thing he possesses has poisonous qual-
ities. But to require in all cases the certificate of a 
medical practitioner, would make it sometimes impossible, 
always expensive, to obtain the article for legitimate 
uses. The only mode apparent to me, in which difficulties 
may be thrown in the way of crime committed through this 
means, without any infringement, worth taking into account, 
upon the liberty of those who desire the poisonous sub-
stance for other purposes, consists in providing what, in 
the apt language of Bentham, is called "preappointed evi-
dence." This provision is familiar to every one in the 
case of contracts. It is usual and right that the law, 
when a contract is entered into, should require as the 
condition of its enforcing performance, that certain 
formalities should be observed, such as signatures, 
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attestation of witnesses, and the like, in order that in 
case of subsequent dispute, there may be evidence to prove 
that the contract was really entered into, and that there 
was nothing in the circumstances to render it legally in-
valid: the effect being, to throw great obstacles in the 
way of fictitious contracts, or contracts made in circum-
stances which, if known, would destory the validity. Pre-
cautions of a similar nature might be enforced in the 
sale of articles adapted to be instruments of crime. The 
seller, for example, might be required to enter in a 
register the exact time of the transaction, the name and 
address of the buyer, the precise quality and quantity 
sold; to ask the purpose for which it was wanted, and 
record the answer he received. When there was no medical 
prescription, the presence of some third person might be 
required, to bring home the fact to the purchaser, in 
case there should afterwards be reason to believe that the 
article had been applied to criminal purposes. Such reg-
ulations would in general be no material impediment to 
obtaining the article, but a very considerable one to 
making an improper use of it without detection. 
The right inherent in society, to j ^ a x d ^ x x X ^ . ^ c x l m e s 
against itself by antecedent precautions, suggests the 
obvious limitations to the maxim, that purely self-
regarding misconduct cannot properly he meddled with in 
the way of prevention or punishment. Drunkenness, for 
example, in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject for 
legislative interference; but I should deem it perfectly 
legitimate that a person, who had once been convicted of 
any act of violence to others under the influence of 
drink, should be placed under a special legal restriction, 
personal to himself; that if he were afterwards found 
drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, and that if when/ 
in that state he committed another offence, the punish- ^ t ^ 1 , 
ment to which he would be liable for that other offence 
should be increased in severity. The making himself 
drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites to do harm to 
others, is a crime against others. So, again, idleness, 
except in a person receiving support from the public, or 
except when it constitutes a breach of contract, cannot 
without tyranny be made a subject of legal punishment; 
but if either from idleness of from any other avoidable 
cause, a man fails to perform his legal duties to others, 
as for instance to support his children, it is no tyranny 
to force him to fulfil that obligation, by compulsory 
labor, if no other means are available. 
Again, there are many acts which, being directly in-
jurious only to the agents themselves, ought not to be 
legally interdicted, but which, if done publicly, are a 
violation of good manners, and coming thus within the 
category of offences against others, may rightfully be 
prohibited. Of this kind are offences against decency; 
on which it is unnecessary to dwell, the rather as they 
only connected indirectly with our subject, the 
W-ttr*'. 
are 
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objection to publicity being equally strong in the case 
of many actions not in themselves condemnable, nor sup-
posed to be so. 
There is another question to which an answer must be 
found, consistent with the principles which have been 
laid down. In cases of personal conduct supposed to be 
blameable, but which respect for liberty precludes so-
ciety from preventing or punishing, because the evil 
directly resulting falls wholly on the agent; what the 
agent is free to do, ought other persons to be equally 
free to counsel or instigate? This question,is not free 
from difficulty. T h e c a s e of a person who solicits an-
other to do an act, is not strictly a case of self-
regarding conduct. To give advice or offer inducements 
to any one, is a social act, and may therefore, like 
actions in general which affect others, be supposed 
amenable to social control. But a little reflection 
corrects the first impression, by showing that if the 
case is not strictly within the definition of individual 
liberty, yet the reasons on which the principle of in-
dividual liberty is grounded, are applicable to it. If 
people must be allowed, in whatever concerns only them-
selves, to act as seems best to themselves at their own 
peril, they must equally be free to consult with one 
another about what is fit to be so done; to exchange 
opinions, and give and receive suggestions. Whatever it 
is permitted to do, it must be permitted to advise to do. 
The question is doubtful, only when the instigator de-
rives a personal benefit from his advice; when he makes it 
his occupation, for subsistence or pecuniary gain, to 
promote what society and the State consider to be an evil. 
Then, indeed, a new element of complication is introduced; 
namely, the existence of classes of persons with an inter-
est xtpposad to what is consider.&d.-as +ho p n M lc weal and 
whose mode of living is grounded on the counteraction of 
it. Ought this to be interfered with, or not? Fornica-
tion, for example, must be tolerated, and so must gam-
bling; but should a person be free to be a pimp, or to 
keep a gambling-house? The case is one of those which 
lie on the exact boundary line between two principles, 
and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it 
properly belongs. There are arguments on both sides. On 
the side of toleratioh~Tt may De said, lhal Ihfc! TWBl of 
following anything as an occupation, and living or profit-
ing by the practice of it, cannot make that criminal which 
would otherwise be admissible; that the act should either 
be consistently permitted or consistently prohibited; that 
if the principles which we have hitherto defended are 
true, society has no business, as society, to decide any-
thing to be wrong which concerns only the individual; that 
it cannot go beyond dissuasion, and that one person should 
be as free to persuade, as another to dissuade. In oppo-
sition to this it may be contended, that although the 
public, or the State, are not warranted in authoritatively 
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deciding, for purposes of repression or punishment, that 
such or such conduct affecting only the interests of the 
individual is good or bad, they are fully justified in 
assuming, if they regard it as bad, that its being so or 
not is at least a disputable question: That, this being 
supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavoring to 
exclude the influence of solicitations which are not dis-
interested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impar-
tial — who have a direct personal interest on one side, 
and that side the one which the State believes to be 
wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal ob-
jects only. There can surely, it may be urged, be nothing 
lost, no sacrifice of good, by so ordering matters that 
persons shall make their election, either wisely or fool-
ishly, on their own prompting, as free as possible from 
the arts of persons who stimulate their inclinations for 
interested purposes of their own. Thus (it may be said) 
though the statutes respecting unlawful games are utterly 
indefensible -- though all persons should be free to 
gamble in their own or each other's houses, or in any 
place of meeting established by their own subscriptions, 
and open only to the members and their visitors — yet 
public gambling-houses should not be permitted. It is 
true that the prohibition is never effectual, and that 
whatever amount of tyrannical power is given to the 
police, gambling-houses can always be maintained under 
other pretences; but they may be compelled to conduct 
their operations with a certain degree of secrecy and 
mystery, so that nobody knows anything about them but 
those who seek them; and more than this, society ought 
not to aim at. There is considerable force in these 
arguments. I will not venture to decide whether they are 
sufficient to justify the moral anomaly of punishing the 
accessary, when the principal is (and must be) allowed to 
go free; of fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not 
the fornicator, the gambling-house keeper, but not the 
gambler. Still less ought the common operations of buy-
ing and selling to be interfered with on analogous grounds. 
Almost every article which is bought and sold may be used 
in excess, and the sellers have a pecuniary interest in 
encouraging that excess; but no argument can be founded 
on this, in favor, for instance, of the Maine Law; because 
the class of dealers in strong drinks, though interested 
in their abuse, are indispensably required for the sake 
of their legitimate use. The interest however, of these 
dealers in promoting intemperance is a real evil, and 
justifies the State in imposing restrictions and requiring 
guarantees, which but for that justification would be in-
fringements of legitimate liberty.... 
It was pointed out in an early part of this Essay, that 
the liberty of the individual, in things wherein the in-
dividual is alone concerned, implies a corresponding lib-
erty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual 
agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard 
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no persons but themselves. This question presents no 
difficulty, so long as the will of all the persons im-
plicated remains unaltered; but since that will may 
change, it is often necessary even in things in which 
they alone are concerned, that they should enter into 
engagements with one another; and when they do, it is 
fit, as a general rule, that those engagements should be 
kept. Yet in the laws, probably, of every country, this 
general rule has some exceptions. Not only persons are 
not held to engagements which violate the rights of third 
parties, but it is sometimes considered a sufficient 
reason for releasing them from an engagement, that it is 
injurious to themselves. In this and most other civil-
ized countries, for example, an engagement by which a 
person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, 
as a slave, would be null and void; neither enforced by 
law nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his 
power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, is 
apparent, and is very clearly seen in this extreme case. 
The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of 
others, with a person's voluntary acts, is consideration 
for his liberty. His voluntary choice is evidence that 
what he so chooses is desirable, or at the least endur-
able, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided 
for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. 
But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his 
liberty; he foregoes any future use of it, beyond that 
single act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the 
very purpose which is the justification of allowing him 
to dispose of himself. He Is no longer free; but is 
thenceforth in a position which has no longer the pre-
sumption in its favor, that would be afforded by his 
voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom 
cannot require that he should be free not to be free. 
It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate his freedom. 
These reasons, the force of which is so conspicuous in 
this peculiar case, are evidently of far wider applica-
tion; yet a limit is everywhere set to them by the neces-
sities of life, which continually require, not indeed 
that we should resign our freedom, but that we should 
consent to this and the other limitation of it. The 
principle, however, which demands uncontrolled freedom 
of action in all that concerns only the agents themselves, 
requires that those who have become bound to one another, 
in things which concern no third party, should be able to 
release one another from the engagement: and even with-
out such voluntary release, there are perhaps no contracts 
or engagements, except those that relate to money or 
money's worth, of which one can venture to say that there 
ought to be no liberty whatever of retractation.... 
I have already observed that, owing to the absence 
of any recognized general principles, liberty is often 
granted where it should be withheld, as well as withheld 
where it should be granted; and one of the cases in which, 
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in the modern European world, the sentiment of liberty is 
the strongest, is a case where, in my view, it is alto-
gether misplaced. A person should be free to do as he 
likes in his own concerns; but he ought not to be free to 
do as he likes in acting for another under the pretext 
that the affairs of another are his own affairs. The 
State, while it respects the liberty of each in what 
specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigil-
ant control over his exercise of any power which it al-
lows him to possess over others. This obligation is 
almost entirely disregarded in the case of the family 
relations, a case, in its direct influence on human hap-
piness, more important than all others taken together. 
The almost despotic power of husbands over wives needs 
not be enlarged upon here, because nothing more is needed 
for the complete removal of the evil, than that wives.-
should ha Ye the sam^ rjghts and^should receive the pro-
Tection of law in the same mannerTIas. all other personsr 
and because, on this subject, the defenders of estab-
lished injustice do not avail themselves of the plea of 
liberty, but stand forth openly as the champions of power. 
It is in the case of children, that misapplied notions of 
liberty are a real obstacle to the fulfilment by the State 
of its duties. One would almost think that a man's chil-
dren were supposed to be literally, and not metaphorically, 
a part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the smallest 
interference of law with his absolute and exclusive con-
trol over them; more jealous than of almost any interfer-
ence with his own freedom of action: so much less do the 
generality of mankind value liberty than power. Consider, 
for example, the case of education. Is it nqt__aljtto^U__a 
self-evident axiom, that the state should, -require, and cTQm-
pel the education, up to a certain standard, of every human 
being who is born its citizen? Yet who is there 
"that is not afraid to recognize and assert this truth? 
Hardly any one indeed will deny that it is one of the most 
sacred duties of the parents (or, as law and usage now 
stand, the father), after summoning a human being into 
the world, to give to that being an education fitting him 
to perform his part well in life towards others and tow-
ards himself. But while this is unanimously declared to 
be the father's duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, 
will bear to hear of obliging him to perform it. Instead 
of his being required to make any exertion or sacrifice 
for securing education to the child, it is left to his 
choice to accept it or not when it is provided gratis" 
It still remains unrecognized, that to bring a child into 
existence without a fair prospect of being able, not only 
to provide food for its body, but instruction and training 
for its mind, is a moral crime, both against the unfortun-
ate offspring and against society; and that if.the pnrftnt 
does not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see 
it f ullilTed""" a t t h e charge, as far as possible, of the 
parent. 
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Were the duty of enforcing universal education once 
admitted, there would be an end to the difficulties about 
what the State should teach, and how it should teach, 
which now convert the subject into a mere battle-field 
for sects and parties, causing the time and labor which 
should have been spent in educating, to be wasted in quar-
relling about education. If the government would make up 
its mind to require, for every child a good education"* .it 
-'might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might 
leave to parents to obtain the education where and how 
they pleased, and content itself with helping it pay the 
school fees of the poorer classes of children, and defray-
ing the entire school expenses of those who have no one 
else to pay for them. The objections which are urged with 
reason against State education, do not apply to the en-
forcement of education by the State, but to the State's 
taking upon itself to direct that education: which is a 
totally different thing. That the whole or any large part 
of the-_edaca.tiQn of the people ..should be...~~~3~S~~_ftn~sj 
I go as far a&.aav one i n deprecating. All that has been 
said of the importance of individuality of character, and 
diversity in opinions and modes of conduct, involves, as 
of the same unspeakable importance, diversity of education, 
A general State education is a mere contrivance •fpy P~«T*«-
inglpeop] tike one another.; and as the 
mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the 
predominant power in the government,. whether this be a 
monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the majority of 
the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient 
and successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, 
leading by natural tendency to one over the body. An edu-
cation established and controlled by the State, should 
only exist if It exist at all, as one among many compet-
ing experiments, carried on for the purpose "of example 
and stimulus,, to keep the others up to a certain standard 
of excellence. Unless, indeed, when society in general is 
in so backward a state that it could not or would not 
provide for itself any proper institutions of education, 
unless the government- undertook the task; then, indeed, 
the government may, as the less of two great evils, take 
upon itself the business of schools and universities, as 
it may that of joint-stock companies, when private enter-
prise, in a shape fitted for undertaking great works of 
industry, does not exist in the' country. But in general, 
if the country contains a sufficient number of persons 
qualified to provide education under government auspices, 
the same persons would be able and willing to give an 
equally good education on the voluntary principle, under 
the assurance of remuneration afforded by a law rendering 
education compulsory, combined with State aid to those 
unable to defray the expense 
It is not in the matter of education only, that 
misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral obligations 
on the part of parents from being recognized, and legal 
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obligations from being imposed, where there are the 
strongest grounds for the former always, and in many 
cases for the latter also. The fact itself, of causing 
the existence of a human being, is one of the most re-
sponsible actions in the range of human life. To under- , 
take this responsibility -- to bestow a life which may be, \j) 
either a curse or a blessing — unless the being on whom
 ( 
it is to be bestowed will have at least the ordinary / (/ 
chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that 
being. And in a country either over-peopled, or threat-
ened with being so, to produce children, beyond a very 
small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of 
labor by their competition, is a serious offence against 
all who live by the remuneration of their labor. The 
laws which, in many countries on the Continent, forbid 
marriage unless the parties can show that they have the 
means of supporting a family, do not exceed the legiti-
mate powers of the State: and whether such laws be ex-
pedient or not (a question mainly dependent on local cir-
cumstances and feelings), they are not objectionable as 
violations of liberty. Such laws are interferences of 
the State to prohibit a mischievous act -- an act injuri-
ous to others, which ought to be a subject of reprobation, 
and social stigma, even when it is not deemed expedient 
to superadd legal punishment. Yet the current ideas of 
liberty, which bend so easily to real infringements of 
the freedom of the individual, in things which concern 
only himself, would repel the attempt to put any re-
straint upon his inclinations when the consequence of 
their indulgence is a life, or lives, of wretchedness and 
depravity to the offspring, with manifold evils to those 
sufficiently within reach to be in any way affected by 
their actions. When we compare the strange respect of 
mankind for liberty, with their strange want of respect 
for it, we might imagine that a man had an indispensable 
right to do harm to others, and no right at all to please 
himself without giving pain to any one. 
I have reserved for the last place a large class of 
questions respecting the limits of government interfer-
ence, which, though closely connected with the subject of 
this Essay, do not, in strictness, belong to it. These 
are cases in which the reasons against interference do 
not turn upon the principle of liberty: the question is 
not about restraining the actions of individuals, but 
about helping them: it is asked whether the government 
should do, or cause to be done, something for their bene-
fit, instead of leaving it to be done by themselves, indi-
vidually, or in voluntary combination. 
The ohjections to povernment interference, when it is 
not such as to involve infringement of liberty, may be~of 
<thr**ge 'h±T***Ts. 
"~Tne"""fixst.„J»s, when the thing, to be done is likely 
±0 be better done by individuals than by the government. 
Speaking generally, there is no one so fit to conduct any 
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business, or to determine how or by whom it shall be con-
ducted, as those who are personally interested in it. 
This principle condemns the interferences, once so common, 
of the legislature, or the officers of government, with 
the ordinary processes of industry. But this part of the 
subject has been sufficiently enlarged upon by political 
economists, and is not particularly related to the prin-
ciples of this Essay. 
The second objection is more nearly allied to our 
subject. m many cases, though individuals may not do the 
particular thing as wei1 t on the average as the officers 
of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should 
be done by themf rather than by the government, as a means. 
to their own mental education — a mode of strengthening 
their active faculties, exercising their judgment, and 
giving them a familiar knowledge of the subjects with 
which they are thus left to deal. This is a principal, 
though not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in 
cases not political); of free and popular local and munic-
ipal institutions; of the conduct of industrial and phil-
anthropic enterprises by voluntary associations. These 
are not questions of liberty, and are connected with that 
subject only by remote tendencies; but they are questions 
of development. It belongs to a different occasion from 
the present to dwell on these things as parts of national 
education; as being, in truth, the peculiar training of a 
citizen, the practical part of the political education of 
a free people, taking them out of the narrow circle of 
personal and family selfishness, and accustoming them to 
the comprehension of joint interests, the management of 
joint concerns — habituating them to act from public or 
semi-public motives, and guide their conduct by aims 
which unite instead of isolating them from one another. 
Without these habits and powers, a free constitution can 
neither be worked nor preserved, as is exemplified by the 
too-often transitory nature of political freedom in coun-
tries where it does not rest upon a sufficient basis of 
local liberties. The management of purely local business 
by the localities, and of the great enterprises of indus-
try by the union of those who voluntarily supply the 
pecuniary means, is further recommended by all the ad-
vantages which have been set forth in this Essay as be-
longing to individuality of development, and diversity of 
modes of action. Government operations tend to be every-
where alike. With individuals and voluntary associations, 
on the contrary, there are varied experiments, and endless 
diversity of experience. What the State can usefully do, 
is to make itself a central depository, and active circu-
lator and diffuser, of the experience resulting from many 
trials. Its business is to enable each experimentalist 
to benefit by the experiments of others, instead of toler-
ating no experiments but its own. 
The-^third, and most cogent_Xfiajsnn for-restriciing 
the interference of government, is the great evil of adding 
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unnecessarily__tQ i t s power. Every function superadded to 
those already exercised by the government, causes its in-
fluence over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, 
and converts, more and more, the active and ambitious 
part of the public into hangers-on of the government, or 
of some party which aims at becoming the government. If 
the roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance offices, 
the great joint-stock companies, the universities, and the 
public charities, were all of them branches of the govern-
ment; if, in addition, the municipal corporations and 
local boards, with all that now devolves on them, became 
departments of the central administration; if the employes 
of all these different enterprises were appointed and 
paid by the government, and looked to the government for 
every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and 
popular constitution of the legislature would make this 
or any other country free otherwise than in name. And 
the evil would be greater, the more efficiently and sci-
entifically the administrative machinery was constructed 
— the more skilful the arrangements for obtaining the 
best qualified hands and heads with which to work it.... 
If indeed all the high talent of the country could be 
drawn into the service of the government, a proposal 
tending to bring about that result might well inspire 
uneasiness. If every part of the business of society 
which required organized concert, or large and compre-
hensive views, were in the hands of the government, and 
if government offices were universally filled by the 
ablest men, all the enlarged culture and practised intel-
ligence in the country, except the purely speculative, 
would be concentrated in a numerous bureaucracy, to whom 
alone the rest of the community would look for all things: 
the multitude for direction and dictation in all they had 
to do; the able and aspiring for personal advancement. 
To be admitted into the ranks of the bureaucracy, and 
when admitted, to rise therein, would be the sole objects 
of ambition. Under this regime, not only is the outside 
public ill-qualified, for want of practical experience, 
to criticize or check the mode of operation of the bureau-
cracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or the natu-
ral working of popular institutions occasionally raise to 
the summit a ruler or rulers of reforming inclinations, 
no reform can be effected which is contrary to the inter-
est of the bureaucracy. Such is the melancholy condition 
of the Russian empire, as is shown in the accounts of 
those who have had sufficient opportunity of observation. 
The Czar himself is powerless against the bureaucratic 
body; he can send any one of them to Siberia, but he can-
not govern without them, or against their will. On every 
decree of his they have a tacit veto, by merely refraining 
from carrying it into effect. In countries of more ad-
vanced civilization and of a more insurrectionary spirit, 
the public, accustomed to expect everything to be done 
for them by the State, or at least to do nothing for 
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themselves without asking from the State not only leave 
to do it, but even how it is to be done, naturally hold 
the State responsible for all evil which befalls them, 
and when the evil exceeds their amount of patience, they 
rise against the government and make what is called a 
revolution; whereupon somebody else, with or without 
legitimate authority from the nation, vaults into the 
seat, issues his orders to the bureaucracy, and every-
thing goes on much as it did before; the bureaucracy 
being unchanged, and nobody else being capable of taking 
their place. 
A very different spectacle is exhibited among a people 
accustomed to transact their own business. In France, a 
large part of the people having been engaged in military 
service, many of whom have held at least the rank of non-
commissioned officers, there are in every popular insur-
rection several persons competent to take the lead, and 
improvise some tolerable plan of action. What the French 
are in military affairs, the Americans are in every kind 
Of Civil business; Tjqt_tjTemheJIj^^ a governmejnt, 
ej^ry,Jxxdy-~uaf__Ameri*""ans is "able to J a r o v i s e one, and to 
Carry on that or any other public business with a suf-
ficient amount of intelligence, order, and decision. 
This is what every free people ought to be: and a people 
capable of this is certain to be free; it will never let 
itself be enslaved by any man or body of men because these 
are able to seize and pull the reins of the central admin-
istration. No bureaucracy can hope to make such a people 
as this do or undergo anything that they do not like. 
But where everything is done through the bureaucracy, 
nothing to which the bureaucracy is really adverse can be 
done at all.... 
To determine the point at which evils, so formidable 
to human f r e e d o m a n d advancement, begiE7 or rather at 
which they begin to predominate over the benefits attend-
ing the collective application of the force of society, 
under its recognized chiefs, for the removal of the ob-
stacles which stand in the way of its well-heing, to 
secure as much of the advantages of centralized power and 
intelligence, as can be had without turning into govern-
mental channels too great a proportion of the general 
activity, i s one of the most difficult and complicated 
questions in the art Of government. It is, in a great 
measure, a question of detail, in which many and various 
considerations must be kept in view, and no absolute rule 
can be laid down. But I believe that the practical prin-
ciple in which safety resides, the ideal to be kept in 
view, the standard by which to test all arrangements in-
tended for overcoming the difficulty, may be conveyed in 
these words: the greatest dissemination of power con-
sistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible cen-
tralization of information, and diffusion of it from the 
centre.... A government cannot have too much of the kind 
of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimu-
lates, individual exertion and development. The mischief 
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begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and 
powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own 
activity for theirs; when, instead of informing, advising, 
and, upon occasion, denouncing, it makes them work in 
fetters, or bids them stand aside and does their work U*4o& 
instead of them. The worth of a State,, in the long run, />** 
is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State 
which postpones the interests of tneir mexvEal expansion 
and elevation, to a little more of administrative skill, 
or that semblance of it which practice gives, in the de-
tails of business; a State which dwarfs its men, in order 
that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even 
for beneficial purposes, will find that with small men no 
great thing can really be accomplished; and that the per-
fection of machinery to which it has sacrificed everything, 
will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital 
power which, in order that the machine might work more 
smoothly, it has preferred to banish. * 
